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Dynamic Equilibrium Strategies in Two-Sided Markets

Dynamic Equilibrium Strategies in Two-Sided Markets

Janik Bürgermeister, Martin Bichler, and Maximilian Schiffer
This study investigates when predatory pricing is a rational strategy for platforms competing in two-sided markets. The researchers develop a multi-stage Bayesian game model, which accounts for real-world factors like uncertainty about competitors' costs and risk aversion. Using deep reinforcement learning, they simulate competitive interactions to identify equilibrium strategies and market outcomes.

Problem Traditional economic models of platform competition often assume that companies have complete information about each other's costs, which is rarely true in reality. This simplification makes it difficult to explain why aggressive strategies like predatory pricing occur and under what conditions they lead to monopolies. This study addresses this gap by creating a more realistic model that incorporates uncertainty to better understand competitive platform dynamics.

Outcome - Uncertainty is a key driver of monopolization; when platforms are unsure of their rivals' costs, monopolies form in roughly 60% of scenarios, even if the platforms are otherwise symmetric.
- In contrast, under conditions of complete information (where costs are known), monopolies only emerge when one platform has a clear cost advantage over the other.
- Cost advantages (asymmetries) further increase the likelihood of a single platform dominating the market.
- When platform decision-makers are risk-averse, they are less likely to engage in aggressive pricing, which reduces the tendency for monopolies to form.
Two-sided markets, Predatory Pricing, Bayesian multi-stage games, Learning in games, Platform competition, Equilibrium strategies